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Abstract
The problem of multi-agent task allocation arises
in a variety of scenarios involving human teams.
In many such settings, human teammates may act
with selfish motives and try to minimize their cost
metrics. In the absence of (1) complete knowledge
about the reward of other agents and (2) the team’s
overall cost associated with a particular allocation
outcome, distributed algorithms can only arrive at
sub-optimal solutions within a reasonable amount
of time. To address these challenges, we introduce
the notion of an AI Task Allocator (AITA) that,
with complete knowledge, comes up with fair allo-
cations that strike a balance between the individual
human costs and the team’s performance cost. To
ensure that AITA is explicable to the humans, we
allow each human agent to question AITA’s pro-
posed allocation with counterfactual allocations. In
response, we design AITA to provide a replay ne-
gotiation tree that acts as an explanation showing
why the counterfactual allocation, with the correct
costs, will eventually result in a sub-optimal al-
location. This explanation also updates a human’s
incomplete knowledge about their teammate’s and
the team’s actual costs. We then investigate whether
humans are (1) able to understand the explanations
provided and (2) convinced by it using human fac-
tor studies. Finally, we show the effect of various
kinds of incompleteness on the length of explana-
tions. We conclude that underestimation of other’s
costs often leads to the need for explanations and in
turn, longer explanations on average.
1 Introduction
Allocation problems are ubiquitous in various settings rang-
ing from industrial processes to financial markets. In these
problems, a set of agents try to agree on allocation of tasks in
a way that is good for them and respects some notion of so-
cial welfare such as fairness, envy-free, etc. Methods used to
reach an allocation outcome comprise of either centralized or
∗indicates equal contribution.
†Contact author.
distributed algorithms where agents share (complete or par-
tial) information about their rewards pertaining to a set of
tasks. In these processes, an agent may either choose to accept
or reject solutions proposed by another agent, in turn propos-
ing solutions they think are profitable to them and acceptable
to the others. Such interactions are termed as negotiation.
In this work, we relax the assumption that human agents
have the cognitive capabilities to reason through an entire ne-
gotiation process, taking into account incomplete/noisy in-
formation about other agents’ costs and the team’s perfor-
mance metric. In such settings, an Artificially Intelligent
Task-Allocation (AITA) agent that is aware of (1) the costs
for all individual agents and (2) the team performance metric
can aid in coming up with a fair allocation (defined formally
later). In doing so, AITA champions the cause for improving
team performance metrics, a variable that neither of the (self-
ish) humans may care about. This setup resembles scenarios
in industrial warehouses where a centralized system assigns
tasks to personnel, who are expected to follow them.
Given that AITA takes away the need for the human agents
to perform a negotiation process, a human agent may not
be necessarily pleased with the proposed allocation because,
with their incomplete knowledge and limited computational
capability, they might believe that the proposed allocation is
not profitable for them. Thus, we allow the human agents
to provide a counterfactual allocation that they think would
reduce their cost while being accepted by the other agents.
AITA can then replay a part of the negotiation tree, along with
the true costs of the other agents, to justify why the proposed
allocation was fair. We show that our explanation always acts
as a certificate to guarantee fairness for a human (i.e. no other
allocation could have been more profitable for them while be-
ing acceptable to others).
In essence, AITA can provide optimal task allocation and,
when questioned using counterfactual (or foils), can explain
why the current allocation is the better one by using (1) re-
ward information unknown to the explaniee and (2) alloca-
tion that would result due to the negotiation that would occur
if the counterfactual was considered. As shown in Fig. 1, the
entire process can be visualized as a conversation between
AITA and an agent.
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Figure 1: AI Task Allocation (AITA) agent comes up with
a task-allocation for a set of human agents. A human agent
can come up with a counterfactual allocation. AITA can then
explain why its proposed allocation is better than the counter-
factual allocation.
2 Related Works
Our work draws inspiration from a set of works in multi-
agent task allocation and, as already states, explanations
in human-aware AI. Prior works in multi-agent task allo-
cation can be divided into centralized and distributed ap-
proaches; the latter more relevant in incomplete information
settings. The former methods focus on combinatorial auc-
tions that have a centralized process for coming up with a
final resource allocation which maximizes the sum of the
prices associated with the bids [Hunsberger and Grosz, 2000;
Cramton, 2006]. In the distributed allocation settings, the
agents autonomously negotiate on resources to agree on lo-
cal deals [Chevaleyre et al., 2010; 2006]. These works seek
to arrive at an allocation (or often called, a deal) that guaran-
tees Pareto optimality [Brams and Taylor, 1996]. There exists
an array of work on finding such Pareto optimal allocations
in such settings [Saha and Sen, 2007; Endriss et al., 2006;
2003]. Similar to our work, there exists a spectrum of work
that consider the use of bargaining games for modeling bilat-
eral (i.e. two-agent) negotiation scenarios [Erlich et al., 2018;
Fatima et al., 2014; Peled et al., 2013]. In contrast to all these
works, we focus on (1) having a centralized entity that comes
up with fair allocations and (2) how such an entity can provide
explanations to human agents who, in the presence of incom-
plete knowledge and limited computational capabilities, may
come up with a counterfactual allocations that they believe is
more optimal for them than the proposed fair allocation.
There also exists an array of work on coming up with ex-
planations in human-aware AI systems– ranging from a gen-
eral overview of what explanations should look like and when
they are effective [Miller, 2018] to explanations that explain
decisions of machine learning systems [Melis and Jaakkola,
2018; Ribeiro et al., 2016] or plans generated by an auto-
mated planners [Chakraborti et al., 2017; Sreedharan et al.,
2017; 2018; Borgo et al., 2018]. Our work is more closely
related to the latter work that views explanations as model
reconciliation, where the model of the AI-agent is assumed
to be error-free while the explainee’s model might be im-
precise or incomplete. In such cases, given a plan, the hu-
man might not be convinced that it is an optimal one. Thus,
they can ask for explanations (at times, based on an alterna-
tive foil [Sreedharan et al., 2018]). In our setting, the human
agents have an incorrect model of the other agent’s cost and
the team performance metric. Thus, given an allocation, they
might be able to think of small edits (counter-factual alloca-
tion) they believe will make the proposed allocation better for
them while not making it worse for other agents. AITA will
replay the negotiation that would take place if the counter-
factual is considered, showing to the human that with the true
costs (only for the allocations in the replay tree) the counter-
factual will result in a more sub-optimal allocation for them.
As opposed to existing work that expects a human is able to
come up with optimal plans in their head [Endriss et al., 2003;
2006], we put reasonable restrictions on the human’s compu-
tational capabilities.
3 Problem Formulation
Our task allocation problem can be defined using a 3-tuple
〈A, T,C〉 where A = {0, 1, . . . , n} where n denotes the AI
Task Allocator (AITA) and 0, . . . n− 1 denotes the n human
agents, T = {T1, . . . , Tm} denotes m tasks (or indivisible
resources) that need to be allocated to the n human agents,
and C = {C0, C1, . . . Cn} denotes the cost functions of each
agent. Cn represents the overall cost metric associated with a
task-allocation outcome o (defined below).
For many real world settings, a human may not be fully
aware of the utility functions of the other human agents [Saha
and Sen, 2007]. In our setting, a human agent i ( ∀ i > 0) is
only aware of its costs Ci and has noisy information about all
the other utility functions Cj ∀ j 6= i. We represent i’s noisy
estimate of j’s cost as Cij . Note that because j ∈ {0, . . . , n},
the human also has a noisy estimate of the team’s cost. Given
a task t, we denote the human i’s cost for that task as Ci(t).
Similarly, human i’s perception of j’s cost for performing
task t is denoted as Cij(t).
An outcomeO is a task allocation such that every task ∈ T
is allocated to exactly one human ∈ A \ {0}. Given that an
outcome is a one-to-many function from the set of human
agents to the set of tasks, |O| = nm. Also, an outcome o can
be written as 〈o1, o2, . . . om〉 where each oi ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
and denotes the human agent performing task i. Let us denote
the set of tasks allocated to a human i, given allocation o, as
Ti = {j : oj = i}. For any allocation o ∈ O, there are two
types of costs for AITA:
(1) cost for each human agent i that can be denoted as a func-
tion of the human’s cost for performing the individual tasks
allocated to them. In our setting, we consider this cost, say
for human i, as Ci(o) = Σj∈TiCi(j).
(2) a performance cost for the given outcome defined over the
allocation outcome O (eg. Cn(o)).
Given incomplete information about the rewards of other
agents, a human’s perception of costs for an allocation o re-
lates to their (true) cost Ci(o), noisy idea of other agent’s
costsCij(o), and noisy idea of the overall team’s costCin(o).
As an example. consider a scenario with two humans {0, 1}
and five tasks {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5} (will be discussed later). An
allocation outcome can thus be represented as a binary (in
general, base-n) string of length five (in general, length m).
For example, 〈01001〉 represents a task allocation in which
agent 0 performs the three tasks T0 = {t1, t3, t4} and 1 per-
forms the remaining two tasks T1 = {t2, t5}. The true cost
for human 0 is C0(〈01001〉) = C0(t1) + C0(t3) + C0(t4),
while the true cost for 1 is C1(t2) + C1(t5).
Negotiation Tree
A negotiation between agents can be represented as a tree
whose nodes represent a two-tuple (i, o) where i ∈ A is the
agent who proposes outcome o as the final-allocation. In each
node of the tree, all other agents j ∈ A\i can choose to either
accept or reject the allocation offer o. If any of them choose
to reject o, the next agent i + 1 (if i + 1 > n, i + 1 = 0) is
asked to make an offer o′ that is (1) not an offer previously
seen in the tree (represented by the set Oparents and (2) is
optimal in regards to agent i+ 1’s cost among the remaining
offers O \Oparents. This creates the new child (i+ 1, o′) and
the tree progresses either until all agents accept the offer or
all outcomes are exhausted. Note that in the worst case, the
negotiation tree can consist of nm nodes, each corresponding
to one allocation in O. Each negotiation step, represented as
a child in the tree, increases the time needed to reach a fi-
nal task-allocation. Hence, similar to previous works [Baliga
and Serrano, 1995], we consider a discount factor (rather a
multiplicative factor given we talk about costs as opposed to
utilities) as we progress down the negotiation tree.
Although we defined what happens when an offer is re-
jected, we do not define the criteria for rejection. As a re-
sponder, an agent’s strategy is{
accept o if Ci(o) ≤ Ci(Oifair)
reject o o.w.
where Oifair represents a fair allocation as per agent i
given its knowledge about Ci, Cij(∀i 6= j), and Cin (the
latter two being inaccurate). We now define a fair allocation
means in our setting, followed by how one can find it.
4 Proposing a Fair Allocation
In this section, we first formally define a fair allocation fol-
lowed by how one can computationally find one. We conclude
the section with an interpretation of fair allocation in terms
of the agent’s cost functions.
Fair Allocation: An allocation is considered fair by all
agents iff, upon negotiation, all the agents are willing to ac-
cept it. Formally, an acceptable allocation at time t of the ne-
gotiation, denoted as Ofair(t), has the following properties:
1. All agents believe that allocations at a later time of the ne-
gotiation will result in a higher cost for them.
∀i, ∀t′ > t Ci(O(t′)) > Ci(Ofair(t))
2. All allocations offered by agent i at time t′′ before t, de-
noted asOimin(t
′′), is rejected at least by one other agent. The
min in the subscript indicates that the allocation Oimin(t
′′) at
time t′′ has the least cost for agent i at time t′′. Formally,
∀t′′ < t, ∃j 6= i, Cj(Oimin(t
′′
)) > Cj(Ofair(t))
We now describe how an agent can find a fair allocation.
4.1 Finding a Fair Allocation
The negotiation process to find a fair allocation can be viewed
as an sequential bargaining game. At each period of the bar-
gaining game, an agent offers an allocation in a round-robin
fashion. If this allocation is accepted by all agents, each
agent incur a cost corresponding to the tasks they have to ac-
complish in the allocation proposed (while AITA incurs the
team’s performance cost). Upon rejection (by even a single
agent), the game moves to the next period. Finding the opti-
mal offer (or allocation in such settings) needs to first enumer-
ate all the periods of the sequential bargaining game. In our
case, this implies constructing an allocation enumeration tree,
i.e. similar to the negotiation tree but considers what happens
if all proposed allocations were rejected.
Given that the sequential bargaining game represents an ex-
tensive form game, the concept of Nash Equilibrium allows
for non-credible threats. In such settings a more refined con-
cept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is desired [Osborne and
others, 2004]. We first define a sub-game and then, the notion
of a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium.
Sub-game: After any non-terminal history, the part of the
game that remains to be played (in our context, the alloca-
tions not yet proposed) constitute the sub-game.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE): A strategy profile s∗
is the SPE of a perfect-information extensive form game if
for every agent i and every history h (after which i has to
take an action), the agent i cannot reduce its cost by choos-
ing a different action, say ai, not in s∗ while other agents
stick to their respective actions. If oh(s∗) denotes the out-
come of history h when players take actions dictated by s∗,
then Ci(oh(s∗)) ≤ Ci(oh(ai, s∗−i).
Given the allocation enumeration tree, we can use the notion
of backward induction to find the optimal move for all agents
in every sub-game [Osborne and others, 2004]. In this, we
first start from the leaf of the tree with a sub-tree of length
one. We then keep moving towards the root, keeping in mind
the best strategy of each agent (and the allocation it leads to).
We claim that if we repeat this procedure until we reach the
root, we will find a fair allocation. To guarantee this, we prove
two results– (1) an SPE always exists and can be found by our
procedure and (2) the SPE returned results in a fair allocation.
Lemma 1. There exists a non-empty set of SPE. An element of
this set is returned by the backward induction procedure.
Proof Sketch: Note that the backward induction procedure al-
ways returns a strategy profile; in the worst case, it corre-
sponds to the last allocation offered in the allocation enumer-
ation tree. Each agent selects the optimal action at each node
of the allocation enumeration tree. As each node represents
the history of actions taken till that point, any allocation node
returned by backward induction (resultant of optimal actions
taken by agents), represents a strategy profile that is an SPE
by definition. Thus, an SPE always exists. 
Corollary The allocation returned by backward induction
procedure is a fair allocation.
Proof Sketch. A proof by contradiction shows that if the allo-
cation returned by the backward induction procedure is not a
fair allocation, then it is not the SPE of the negotiation game,
contradicting Lemma 1.
4.2 Interpreting Fair Allocations
Although we define a fair allocation with respect to the nego-
tiation procedure, we now discuss how it can be interpreted in
terms of the cost incurred by an agent. Let us denote the opti-
mal allocation for an agent i as Oiopt. Note that for any multi-
agent setting, Ci(Oiopt) = 0 because in the optimal case, all
tasks are allocated to the other agents j(6= i). Clearly, the ne-
gotiation process prunes out this solution because at least one
other agent j( 6= i) will reject this solution.1
Let us denote the allocation obtained by the backward in-
duction procedure as OSPE . For an agent i, this allocation is
∆ = Ci(OSPE)−Ci(Oiopt) = Ci(OSPE) away from the op-
timal solution they could have obtained. Given that all agents
either (1) make an offer based on that is least cost for them at
a particular time of negotiation or (2) reject offers based on
their belief of getting a lower cost solution in the future, the
fair allocation OSPE is guaranteed to be the closest to their
optimal solution accepted by all other agents.
5 Explaining a Proposed Allocation
In this section, we describe the notion of a human’s coun-
terfactual allocation. For this, we assume certain inferential
capabilities the human has. We describe what a contrastive
explanation means in this context and prove that given a coun-
terfactual allocation, there always exists such an explanation.
5.1 Human’s Counterfactual Allocation
AITA, with the correct information about the costs, was able
to come up with a fair allocation. Now it can offer this as
an outcome to the human. Humans who have noisy estimates
of the other costs (and limited computational abilities), may
come up with an allocation given o, which they think can re-
sult in lower cost for them and will be accepted by all other
players. This notion of a counterfactual can be formally de-
fined as follows.
1Note that this assumption might not hold if the number of tasks
are less than the number of agents and each task can be done by one
agent because in such settings, there will always exist an i who is
not allocated any tasks.
Figure 2: Negotiation tree enumerated by agent 1 to come up
with the best counterfactual when offered o = 〈01001〉.
Counterfactual allocation Given an allocation o, an alterna-
tive o′ in human i’s model is a counterfactual iff
1. o′ is in the set of allocations regarding their limited com-
putational capability (this implies that o 6= o′)
2. Ci(o) > Ci(o′) (i has lower cost in o′)
3. o′ is an SPE in allocation enumeration tree made from
allocations from o given their computational capability.
We now state assumptions made about the computational
capabilities of a human.
Human Capabilities
We assume that given a particular allocation outcome o =
〈o1, . . . oj〉, a human will only consider outcomes o′ where
only one task in o is allocated to a different human j. In
the context of our example, given allocation 〈010〉, the hu-
man can only consider the three allocations 〈011〉, 〈000〉 and
〈110〉; outcomes are one hamming distance away. With this
assumption in place, a human is considered capable of rea-
soning about a negotiation tree with m ∗ (n − 1) allocations
(as opposed to nm) in the worst case2.
Fig. 2 shows the negotiation tree an agent used to come
up with the optimal counterfactual allocation. The reason is
similar to saying ‘if I instead chose o1, AITA will reject it
because of high team costs and agent 1 in its turn will offer
o2 which I will reject and then AITA will offer . . .’. An SPE
of this tree provides the best counterfactual (if SPE 6= o) the
human can offer.
5.2 Explanation as a Negotiation Tree
We now show that whenever there exists an optimal counter-
factual o′ for at least one of the human agents i ∈ {0, . . . , n−
1}, AITA can come up with an effective explanation that
shows to the human(s) i that o is a better solution for them
than their counterfactual oi.
We thus, propose to describe a negotiation tree, which
starts with the counterfactual at its root and excludes the orig-
inal allocation o, as an explanation. This differs from the hu-
2any way to limit the computational capability of a human can
be factored into the backward induction algorithm. Due to the lack
of literature on how compute abilities may be relaxed in a task-
allocation setting, we consider 1-edit distance as a starting point.
man’s negotiation tree because it uses the actual costs as op-
posed to using the noisy cost estimates. Also, AITA can pro-
vide allocations it chose when asked to offer allocations and
these may not necessarily be a one-edit distance away from
oi. We finally show that an SPE in this tree results in an SPE
that cannot yield a lower cost for the human i than o. At that
point, we expect a rational human to be convinced that o is
a better allocation than the counterfactual allocation they of-
fered. We can now define what an explanation is in our case.
Explanation. An explanation is a negotiation tree with true
costs that shows the counterfactual allocation oi will result in
a final allocation oˆi such that Ci(oˆi) ≥ Ci(o).
Even before describing how this looks in the context of our
example, we need to ensure one important aspect– given a
counterfactual o′ against o, an explanation always exists.
Lemma 2. Given allocation o (the fair allocation offered by
AITA) and a counterfactual allocation oi (offered by i), there
will always exist an explanation.
Proof Sketch: We showcase a proof by contradiction; consider
an explanation does not exist. It would imply that there exists
oˆi that reduces human i’s cost (i.e. Ci(o) ≥ Ci(oˆi)) and is
accepted by all other players after negotiation. By construc-
tion, o was a fair allocation and thus, if a human was able to
reduce its costs without increasing another agent’s cost, all
agents will not have accepted oˆi. As o is also the resultant
of a sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy of the allocation
enumeration tree with true costs AITA would have chosen oˆi.
Given AITA chose o, there cannot exist such a oˆi. 
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we consider two kinds of experiments– (1)
human factors on a synthetically designed task-allocation do-
main and (2) the effect various amount of inaccuracies (about
costs) have on the explanation length for a well known project
management domain [Certa et al., 2009].
6.1 Human Factors
Setup and Study Details The task allocation scenario for
the study, keeping in mind that the subjects of our study were
only graduate students, was based on allocating three differ-
ent parts of writing a paper–introduction, literature review
and main contribution– to the human (subject) and their co-
worker. The subjects were given their cost and only heuristic
guidance about their co-worker’s cost, who was a senior grad-
uate student. We did not provide them with a noisy estimate
to see the assumptions they would organically make about the
other cost and the paper quality (the overall team cost). We
had a total of 40 graduate students participate in the study.
Results AITA provided them with the (fair) allocation o =
〈Y,C, Y 〉 where Y denotes the task (intro and main contri-
bution) was assigned to the subject and C denotes the task
(literature review) allocated to their co-worker. The subjects
were first asked if they considered a counterfactual allocation
they think would improve their costs while being accepted by
others. Among the 3 options given to them, 22 participants
felt that the task allocation was fair and said that they did not
want to offer a counterfactual, 3 considered 〈Y,C,C〉 while
the remaining 15 considered 〈C,C, Y 〉 as a counterfactual.
Figure 3: Was the explanation understandable?
Figure 4: Was the explanation convinving?
People who considered the allocation as fair were asked to
explain their answer. We gathered from their subjective re-
sponse that most participants overestimated the actual cost of
their co-worker in performing the literature review and thus,
believed that an allocation that imposes any more work on
them will be rejected. Interestingly, a couple of participants
reasoned that if they were to perform all the three tasks alone,
they would be doing (almost) double the work. Thus, with the
inherent assumption that their co-worker is equally skilled as
them in all the tasks, they felt this was a fair allocation of
tasks (as they were allocated ≈ 50% of the total work). Thus,
if their estimates about the other agent were not drastically
far off than the reality, our idea of a fair allocation seemed to
resonate with majority of the participants.
For the 18 participants who felt that there was a counter-
factual allocation that improved their costs and would be ac-
cepted, we provided them with the replay negotiation tree as
an explanation and then asked them two questions– (1) was
it understandable? and (2) was it convincing? The responses
to there were measured using the Likert scale. As per the re-
sults show in Figure 3 and 4, majority of the participants felt
that the explanation was ‘understandable’ and ‘moderately
convincing’. By analysing the response of the six participants
who felt the explanation was not or slightly convincing, we
saw that most of them failed to understand the cost calcula-
tions shown at each node of the negotiation tree. Some felt
that the overall paper quality was not being considered (al-
though we showed the overall cost considered by AITA in
the explanation). For the others, they suggested that breaking
down the cost calculations or augmenting the negotiation tree
with a description would convince them more.
6.2 Impact of Noise on Explanations
Scenario Description We use the project management sce-
nario from [Certa et al., 2009] in which human resources (aka
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.077 0.8
2 0.4 0.7 0.077 0.49 0.13
Table 1: Agent’s true costs for completing a task.
researchers) have to be allocated to R&D projects. We modify
the original setting in the following ways. First, we consider
the problem with two human agents (instead of eight) while
keeping the number of projects (equal to five) to be the same.
As there are 25 = 32 possible allocations, it helps us come up
with examples of reasonable length. Also, we can represent
these allocations by five bit binary strings that are easier to
understand. Second, The project allocation problem consid-
ers various aspects of a human agent such as skills, learning
abilities and social relationships. However, we consider only
the skill aspect.3 We use the skill measure to come up with
the time needed for completing a project and make it equal
to the agent’s cost (more the time needed to complete, more
the cost). There are a total of 2 ∗ 5 = 10 costs, 5 for each
human (shown in Table 1). Further, we have 10 additional
costs that represent the noisy perception of one human’s cost
by another human. Third, we consider an aggregate metric
that considers the time taken by the two humans to complete
all the tasks. Corresponding to each allocation, there are 32
(true) costs for team performance shown below (not enumer-
ated here for space considerations).
With these cost and limitations of compute capabilities, as
shown in Figure 1, the SPE (or the fair allocation) is 〈01001〉,
the optimal counterfactual for agent 1 is 〈00001〉 which is
revoked by AITA using an explanation tree of length three.
Impact of Norm-bounded Noise The actual cost Ci of
each human i as a vector of length m. A noisy assumption
about Ci can be represented by another vector situated  dis-
tance away using l2 distance measure. By controlling , we
can adjust the magnitude of noise each human has.
In Figure 5, we highlight the effect of noise on the expla-
nation length. The x-axis indicates the amount of noise we
injected. The noisy cost was sampled from the l2 norm ball
with radius equal to the highest cost in the vector multiplied
by  [Calafiore et al., 1998].4 The y-axis indicates the length
of the replay negotiation tree shown to the human, called ex-
planation length. Even though the maximum length of expla-
nation could be 31(25 − 1) we say that explanation length
was, at max, eight. Given that every noise injected results in
a different scenario, we average the explanation length across
ten runs (indicated by the solid lines). We also plot the addi-
tive variance (indicated by the dotted lines) to give the reader
a sense of the explanation length we show the human. The
high variance on the negative side, not plotted, is a result of
the cases where either (or both) of the human(s) didn’t have a
counterfactual; thus, the explanation length was zero.
3Although we set the weightage of the learning abilities and so-
cial relationships to be zero, a function that can combine the three
measures into a real number can also be used for cost calculations.
4Given that negative costs don’t make sense in our setting, we
consider only the non-negative space inside the norm-ball.
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Figure 5: Mean length of explanations as the amount of noise
added to the actual costs increases.
We initially hypothesized, appealing to common sense, that
an increase in the amount of noise will result in a longer ex-
planation. The curve in red (with ◦) is indicative that this is
not true. To understand why this happens, we classified noise
into two types– Optimistic Noise (ON) and Pessimistic Noise
(PN)– representing the scenarios when a human agent overes-
timates or under-estimates the cost of the other human agents
for performing a task. When a human overestimates the cost
of others, given an allocation, it realizes any edit will lead to
a higher cost for other agents, who will thus reject it. Thus, it
becomes harder for them to come up with a good counterfac-
tual; in turn having explanations of length zero (that reduces
the average length of explanations). In the case of PN, the hu-
man thinks that other humans can easily perform all the tasks,
i.e. over-estimates their skill, and in turn underestimates their
cost. Thus, upon being given an allocation, they will often
find a one-edit allocation that they think is less costly for them
and others won’t reject; in turn, increasing the average length
of explanations. As random noise is a combination of both
ON and PN (overestimates costs of some humans for partic-
ular tasks but underestimates their cost for other tasks etc.),
the increase in the length of explanations is counteracted by
zero length explanations. Hence, in expectation, we do not
see an increase in explanation length as we increase the ran-
dom noise magnitude. As per this understanding, when we
increase  and only allow for PN, we clearly see an increase
in the mean explanation length (shown in green).
When  = 0, there is no noise added to the costs, i.e. the
humans have complete knowledge about the team’s and the
other agent’s costs. Yet, due to limited computation capabil-
ities, a human can still come up with a counterfactual that
needs explanation. Hence, we see a mean explanation length
of 1 even for zero noise.
Incompleteness about a sub-set of agents In many real-
world scenarios, an agent may have complete knowledge
about some of their team-mates but noisy assumptions about
others. To study the impact of such incompleteness, we
considered a modified scenario project-management domain
[Certa et al., 2009] with four tasks and four humans. We then
choose to vary the size of the sub-set about whom a human
has complete knowledge. In Fig. 6, we plot the mean length
of explanations, depending upon the subset size about whom
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Figure 6: As the number of agents about whom a human has
complete knowledge (co-workers whose costs you know) in-
creases, the mean length of explanations decreases.
the human has complete knowledge.
We consider five runs for each sub-set size and only pes-
simistic noise (that ensures a high probability of having
a counterfactual and thus, needing explanations). We no-
tice as the number of individuals about whom a human has
complete knowledge increases, the mean relative explana-
tion length (times the max explanation length) decreases uni-
formly across the different magnitude of noise µ. Even when
a human has complete knowledge about all other agent’s
costs, happens whenever the size of the sub-set is n−1 (three
in this case), it may still have some incompleteness about the
team’s performance costs. Added with limited computational
capabilities (to search in the space of 16 allocations), they
might still be able to come up with counterfactual; in turn,
needing explanations.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a task-allocation problem where
an AI Task Allocator (AITA) comes up with a fair allocation
for a group of humans. When humans have limited computa-
tional capability and incomplete information about all other
costs than their own, they can come up with counterfactual
allocations that they believe are more fair. We show that in
such cases, AITA is able to come up with a negotiation tree
that explains if the counterfactual is considered, it would re-
sult in final allocation that is costlier that the one proposed.
With human studies, we show that our notion of fair alloca-
tion aligns well with majority of humans while for the others,
our explanations are understandable and moderately convinc-
ing. We also perform experiments to show that when agents
either overestimate the cost of other agents or have accurate
information about more agents, the average length of expla-
nations decreases.
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